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The evolution of agricultural cooperative thought, theory, and purpose inthe United
States is reviewed from the standpoint of the reemergence of interest in how coopera-
tives can provide some of the security and benefits that might be lost with gradual
phasing out of federal government farm support programs. By accomplishing group
action for self-help, the early development of cooperatives drew considerable attention
from economists, social theorists, and politicians. Alternative schools of cooperative
thought developed, but most proponents of cooperatives regarded them as having enor-
mous potential to provide a public service role in building a more economically stable
and democratic society This paper also surveys how cooperative theory was developed
more rigorously in the post-WWII period. It has provided better analytical tools for
understanding how and why cooperatives have changed in response to technological
and economic developments, as well as to social trends, like individualism. Given the
new perspectives on cooperative theory and the scope of changes in how cooperatives
operate and are structured, cooperatives have even greater potential for coordinating
self-help actions, butthis potentialneeds the support of cooperative education services.
A review ofdevelopmentsin cooperative thought and theory provides an opportunity
to gain new perspectives on earlier works and to gain renewed appreciation. Recently
much ofthis work has been reprinted in several issues oftheJournal ofCooperation and in
the reissue ofEconomic Theory ojCooperation by Ivan Emelianoff (1942).
In reviewing the evolution ofimportant ideas, it is important not to lose sight oftheir
historical context and how they were affected by developments in cooperative practice.
The evolution of agricultural marketing cooperatives has its roots in the emergence of
commercialagriculture duringthenineteenthcentury. Subsequentrefinementswere honed
by the development oftwo distinctly American schools ofthought, the California and the
CooperativeYardstick schools. A characteristic ofAmerican thought is that it is seeped in
pragmatism, contrasted to some European schools that were affected by great social re-
forms and associated philosophies ofthe times. The distinctiveness ofthe American schools
of thought gave rise to particular policy roles for cooperatives. These policy roles have
been further developed by a combination of public and private stimulus. This paper
delineates these policy roles in the context of evolving thought, theory, and purpose of
cooperatively owned businesses.
The conceptual role is drawn from economic, sociological, politicalscience, and mana-
gerial behavioral fields in a holistic lookat the political economy The intentis to demon-
strate why, with the end ofa period ofsixty years of federal farm programs, cooperatives
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may have increasinglyimportant roles to play in (1) providing agricultural producers access
to markets and (2) providing vehicles for capturingvalue added. Cooperatives are strategi-
cally adjusting and repositioning their operations. However, to continue to act in the inter-
ests of producers, they will need to use fundamental cooperative principles as their sources
ofprimary logic and organizational discipline.
Early History of NorthAmerican Cooperatives
In looking back, considerable weight and influence is attributed to various social and
economic philosophies influencing the development of institutions for carrying out eco-
nomic activity, includingcooperatives' roles indifferent political systems. Early experiments
were influencedbyutopian schemes during the early European industrial revolution. These
had their limited transplants-suchas Robert Owen's New Harmonyandthe Rochdale prin-
ciples that influenced governance rules and distribution practices in the United States-but
the main stream ofagricultural cooperation developed independently as a self-help form of
business. Cooperatives in NorthAmericawere organized to move product to markets and to
influence price and other terms oftrade-consistent with market supply and demand con-
ditions-while providing fair treatment, other services, and more protection from exploit-
ative opportunism. Attempts to explainthe economics ofwhycooperativesare organized, as
opposed to other methods of achieving economies of size, form a major thrust of recent
thought and theory In reviewing developments over time, a similar question emerges in
terms of why agricultural cooperatives formed and how significant was this formation that
took root in North America.
Beginningin the late nineteenth century, cooperative marketingwas fostered by farmers'
professional associations during a series of farmer movements. The development of these
cooperatives can be characterized, ina sociological sense, as a social movement ofindepen-
dent farm operators seeking to enhance and protect their place inthe economic organization
ofagriculture.
The Cooperative Commonwealth School
The cooperative commonwealth school of thought found strong support in European
approaches to development ofacomprehensive organizational structure that forges linkages
with related orancillary business service organizations. This had some influence on a num-
ber of early American pioneers like Howard A. Cowden and Murray Lincoln. This school
took the perspective that cooperatives would evolve into the dominant form of business
activity in consumer and farm sectors. They would create economic and social order by
using federations and other links between cooperatives and their allied support groups, like
professional farmers associations and labor unions (Bonner 1961). Sucha predominant role
notonly gave stature to the membersas aclass, butalso made cooperatives amajor source of
influence in the broader political economy
The California School
The California school initiated by Aaron Sapiro, in contrast, sought to correct imbal-
ances in grower treatment and to improve marketing coordination by using cooperatives
organized along commodity lines to achieve more orderly marketing (Sapiro 1920, Larsen
and Erdman 1962). Advocacy ofdirect membership associations organized along commod-
itylines, usinglong-termmembership contracts andprofeSSional management, was particu-
larly well suited to many specialty crops grown in rather confined regions like the Pacific
Coast. By organizinga major marketshare and emphasizinggradingand pooling techniques,
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quences of dumping them on the market at harvest. Sapiro's advocacy met wider success
among crops grown within limited territory than it did with those grown over broad geo-
graphical areas. Nevertheless, he created abroad awareness inthe UnitedStates and Canada
of producers' abilities to influence terms of trade through cooperative organizations. The
efforts in organizing farmers and developing thrusts in several different commodity sectors
was a major influence in passage of the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 and the Cooperative
MarketingAct of 1926. Further, the Sapiro approach was adopted andmodified for creation
oflargelyunsuccessful, top-down, national commoditycooperatives underthe Federal Farm
Board in 1929. The Sapiro approachwas also anantecedentto the orderly marketingmecha-
nisms created by the Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act of 1937.
The Competitive Yardstick School
The other major school of American cooperative thought was developed by Professor
E.G. Nourse, and has become known as the competitive yardstick school (Nourse 1922,
1944; Knapp 1979). It developed as a reaction to Sapiro's advocacy of direct membership
cooperatives often organizedonaregional basis. Nourse, a Chicago free-market school trained
economist, advocated a much more modest vision ofcooperative structure. This originated
from locally organized service cooperatives that were characteristic of the livestock, farm
supply, and grain elevator organizations that sprung up in the Midwest. He emphasized
local control that manifested itself in cooperatives organized to meet producers' needs in a
local community. Nourse posited that cooperatives could be organized to represent a lim-
ited share of marketing activity and still serve a yardstick role by which members could
measure the performance ofother firms dominating the marketing channel. This check and
balance function provided a checkpoint on other businesses and forced them to be more
competitive. If markets became more competitive by virtue of the role of cooperatives,
Nourse argued in an economist's rhetorical fashion, their role was fulfilled and they could
cease to exist. In practice, such perfectly competitive market conditions do not become
established in any lasting way. Since he opposed the Sapiro formation of democratically
controlled and dominantcommodityassociations, Nourse advocated thatcooperativescould
attain scale economies by affiliating through purchasing or marketing federations that pre-
served a bottom-up structure rather than a more centralized, top-down one.
The emphasis on market development, service, effiCiency; and competition created a
public policy rationale for supporting the organization of more cooperatives as a partial
answer to farm price and income problems. The competition-enhancing rationale also be-
came an importantelement in treatment under tax and antitrust codes. This school ofcoop-
erative thoughtwas enhanced by Nourse's stature inacademic circles. He helped organize, in
1925, a floating university, the American Institute ofCooperation. This was created for prac-
tical discussion about best cooperative principles and operatingpractices. The competition-
enhancingschool ofcooperative thoughtwas also assisted byNourse's professional roles. He
was the elected president ofthe American Farm EconomicsAssociation and ofthe American
Economics Association, and he was, later, chairman of the first President's Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors under Harry S. Truman.
Influence ofThought on Structure and Purpose ofCooperatives
The California and Nourse schools clearly had theirimpact onhowvariousgroups orga-
nizedandhow theyjustifiedtheirstructures and functions. Their contributions subsequently
helped shape how academicians and policy makers viewed cooperative structure. The
California school, under Sapiro's advocacy, aimed at unifying farmers in commodity-wide
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commodity cooperatives also achieved channel coordination and emphasized new product
development and operating efficiency to improve returns through adequate market share
and appropriate business management (Cotterill 1984).
The Nourse school viewed cooperatives as having a role inany producermarket-localor
regional-ofgivingfarmers a"competitive yardstick" basis onwhichtojudgethe performance
ofinvestor-owned firms. While Sapiro specified astandardsystem for producercoordination,
Nourse was more altruistic and tended to be more conceptuallyvague inthe sense ofmeasur-
inggoal attainment for members. Both hadelements ofpublic-good services that cooperatives
performed on behalfof their members and the broader agricultural production and consum-
ingsectors.
Key conditions leading to group action are:
1. a limited number ofbuyers of farm production ancIJor sellers ofinputs to farmers,
2. an atomistic structure characterized by a higher number and smaller size of farm
operators compared to others in the market channel, and
3. a high incidence of specialized assets in farming that lead to inelastic supplies of
farm products.
The changing market structure of agriculture, a prime motivator in early organizing efforts
associated with the emergence ofcommercial agriculture, remains today the underlying ra-
tionale for cooperative efforts by farm operators (Torgerson 1977). Farmers also organized
because services were not available to them in their rural communities or because those
services were not available at reasonable costs. Recent studies continue to document that
market failure, excessive transaction costs, discriminatory treatment of contract growers,
and increased monopsony in buyer markets are conditions leading to group action by pro-
ducers.
Development of Cooperative MarketingTheory
A strength of the Sapiro and Nourse ideas is that they specify objectives and organiza-
tional structures for cooperatives that address the concerns of agricultural producers in a
context that achieves apublic interest role. In bothschools ofthought, cooperatives provide
some balancing of market power, whether affecting the terms of trade for an industry-wide
commodity(the Sapiro school), orinstimulatingcompetitioninspecific markets (the Nourse
school). In their conceptions, cooperatives capture a larger share of industry earnings for
the membership, but also contribute to market or industry efficiency. In other words, their
philosophies of cooperation were grounded in a public interest perspective, as recognized
legislatively in the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922.
Sapiro and Nourse made major contributions to the practical problems of achieving
member commitmentand cohesive organizations. Yet, subsequentcooperative thoughtmoved
further into examining and modelingkey facets ofinternal organization, developing a more
coherent theory of agricultural cooperation. Over the years since Sapiro and Nourse, there
has beensome shift in emphasis from concernwith the external effects oforganization to the
internal ormicro aspects oforganizingandsustainingcooperation. The advent offarm price
support programs may have placed some ofthe interest in the public policy role ofcoopera-
tives on the back burner. In part, agricultural economists have given their attention to un-
derstanding the issues of member commitment and efficient operations as the cooperative
movement has matured and organizations have confronted major changes in their indus-
tries. To some extent, too, the focus oninternal aspects oforganization inagricultural coop-
erative theory has reflected new directions in economics. It has reflected, perhaps, the
influence of that profession's gradual division into a macroeconomics for economy-wide
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making. Many types ofcoordinationissues andsystems ofgroup coordinationhave received
negligible attention from microeconomists, which might be due to their philosophical as-
sumption ofmethodological individualism.
These comments are not meant to suggest that theoretical work on the public role of
agricultural cooperativeshas beenlackingsince Sapiro and Nourse. Infact, significant work
continues to be carried outbyseveral economists, usingindustrial organizationmodels, that
reveals the external or market performance benefits of cooperatives (Cotterill 1987, 1997;
Rogers and Marion 1990; Haller 1993; Rogers and Petraglia 1994). Effects ofcooperatives
on industry-wide coordination are addressed in much of the cooperative bargaining litera-
ture (Ladd 1964; Bunje 1980). An excellent framework for understandingcoordinationand
the role ofcooperatives inmacro coordinationwas developed byJames Shaffer, andhe noted
that this role "...deserves a good deal more attention" (1987).
A major step in understanding the internal economics of cooperatives was made by
Emelianoffin the 1940s, with a conception of the cooperative as a form ofvertical integra-
tion (1942). Emelianoff's attempt to construct a more comprehensive theory of cooperation
is particularlynotable for its focus onthe structural and functional relationships ofmembers
to theircooperative marketingorganizationthat was latter pickedup and refined byRobotka
(1947) and his cadre ofstudents, like Phillips (1953) and Aresvik (1955). Emelianoff con-
cluded that cooperatives represent an aggregate of economic units (members) and are not
themselves acquisitive economic units. In otherwords, Emelianoffdeveloped a conception
ofa cooperative as pure agency with members as principals.
Phillips developed a model ofoutputandpricing decisions as logically derived from the
Emelianoff-Robotka vertical integration framework. He identified a decision rule for mem-
bers to producewhere their marginal costs equaled the cooperative's marginal revenue. How-
ever, several economistshave pointedoutthe flaws inthis model (Trifon 1961, Sexton 1984.
Royer 1994, and Staatz 1994). Suboptimalearnings would result whenever a cooperative's
operations were subject to either increasing or decreasing marginal costs, unless there was
some way that all members could coordinate their outputs, which Phillips left unspeCified.
Emelianoff, Robotka, and Phillips clarified the importance of a principal-agent relation-
ship in understanding cooperatives. Although this relationship is too simplistic by itself to
provide a comprehensive explanation of cooperative decision making and governance, ef-
fective member control consists of members carrying out their role as principals, repre-
sentedbydirectors, with management functioning as theiragents. Inthe Emelianoff, Robotka,
and Phillips conceptions ofa cooperative, the answer to the "benefits to whom" question is
clear and unambiguous.
Phillips carried the logic of vertical integration into defining all member dealings and
relationships instrictly proportional terms. All contributions and benefits are received from
and returned to members in equal ratios or proportions. Governance is likewise based on
member voting in proportion to patronage volume or use.
The shortcomings ofPhillips's output andpricingdecision rules derived from the lack of
some form ofa modified theory ofthe firm for cooperatives. By the 1960s, Helmberger and
Hoos filled thisvoid andaccomplished are-working ofagricultural cooperative theory Analo-
gous to the theory of the firm, cooperatives have an optimization objective, but it is to
maximize benefits to members. In their model, a cooperative maximizes the per unit value
or average price bydistributing all earnings back to members in proportion to their patron-
age volume or use.
There are excellent discussions ofthe Helmberger-Hoos model andits contributionsand
comparisonswith the workof Phillips inseveral reports andissues oftheJournal ofCoopera-
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a modified theory ofthe firm approach and analyzingshort-runandlong-run decisions, the
Helmberger-Hoos modelidentified the incentives that can potentiallyexist for currentmem-
bers to limit the size ofacooperatives membership. Theirmodel revealed potential conflicts
ofinterest ifmanagementwants to expand a cooperative's volume insituations ofdecreasing
returns. When such output expansion is based on new members, it diminishes earnings to
the original or currentmembership. Hence, their modelis bothconsistentwith the reality of
an independentdecision responsibilityby management in cooperatives and the existence of
complex member control issues that were missing in the Phillips's model.
Several new directions in economic theory have emerged since the 1960s. Some com-
ments on the nature of these approaches are relevant to understanding many of the recent
developments inagricultural cooperativetheoryandpractice. Traditionaleconomic analysis
locates the existence ofprofit as primarilya function ofmarket structure. Workingwith this
assumption, economists traditionally tended to neglect the internal structure of incentives
in organizations (Shoemaker 1990). It is interesting to note that, at the time Emelianoffwas
writing, there was a lack ofan adequate theory ofenterprise. In using an analogue method
ofreasoning, he needed sucha definition, and he devoted the first part ofhis essay to devel-
oping a concept of enterprise, which provided a point of contrast for conceptualizing a
cooperative.
Different approaches to the problems of modeling internal organization have been
introduced from many sources. Four are particularly relevant to recent developments in
agricultural cooperative theory: (1) economics of property rights, (2) new institutional or
transactions cost economics, (3) local or group public goods theory, and (4) game-theoretic
approaches to economics.
Since the 1960s, the economics of property rights have been applied to a wide range of
policy issues, from pollution to business strategy Property rights are defined as capacity to
use or to control the use ofan asset or resource (Demsetz 1967). Economic applications of
property rights are broadened when control and use are specified for various attributes of
assets, rendering a divided ownership in accordance with those parties who can make the
most efficient use ofthose attributes (Barzel1997). The extent to which propertyrights are
delineated for the attributes of assets, or to which this delineation is lacking or compro-
mised, determines howefficiently such assets will be employed or conserved.
Formanypolicy analysts, the economics ofpropertyrights canhelp explain and correct
many kinds of market failures and provide alternative solutions to those of activist govern-
ment. In one of the early formulations of this approach, Demsetz regards many forms of
humancooperation, particularlythose involvingagreement, as unworkable and deadlocked
without clearly defined and enforced property rights. The property rights approach is evi-
dentinmuchofthe new institutional economics, and it clarifies the distinction ofpatronage
as a basis for ownership and control ofcooperatives, rather than investment. This analytical
approach also provides many cooperatives much of the rationale for establishing member
delivery rights.
In arecent paperbyCook, property rights are critical instruments for enabling coopera-
tives to be sustainable, producer-controlled businesses. In his view, by first accomplishing
internal stabilitywith adequately defined property rights, cooperatives can then carry out a
role ofimprovingmarket performance or of, in his words, "correctingmarket failures" (1995).
New developments in institutional economics have extended the applicability and rel-
evance ofpropertyTights economics. Major strides have been made in specifying how mar-
kets and organizations are defined by, and then function with, propertyrights (whatis called
mechanisms ofgovernance). This is amajor thrustofthe newinstitutionalistschool ofthought,
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Establishing property rights to assets or their attributes involves transaction costs. The
new institutional economics links the minimization ofthese transaction costs with the cre-
ation and design of different forms of organization and contracting. This is particularly
relevant to examining why cooperatives are formed, as opposed to other methods that pro-
ducers might employ to gain economies ofsize (Staatz 1987a).
Astrategic aspect relevant to many agricultural producers is the problem ofasset fixity or
specificity, that may render them vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by product purchasing
firms. Williamson andothereconomists, usinganewinstitutionalistapproach, have identified
this type ofvulnerabilityas arationale for vertical integration (Williamson 1971). Itis apparent
that some cooperatives provide a response to this type ofpotential market failure.
One ofthe advantages of applying a new institutionalist approach to agricultural coop-
eratives, orbusiness firms ingeneral, is the understandingit offers oforganizational strategy.
This method ofanalysis is applied bySporleder to understandrecent trends ofvertical coor-
dination and strategic alliances in agriculture (Sporleder 1992).
Important clarifications of the meaning oflocal orgroup public goods were worked out
independently by Buchanan and Olson in the mid-1960s (Buchanan 1965, Olson 1965).
Buchanan noted the need of filling the void between the Samuelsonian pure public goods
and private goods, with a theory of clubs or cooperative membership. His theory of clubs
models the conditions for stable and optimal cooperation for control over, and use of, a
common property asset. Such common property is a public good in that all members have
equal access andtheir use does notdetract or diminish the use byothers in the group. Such
local or group public goods depend on restricting membership size.
Practitionersincooperative developmentand structuringmaynotfind the premises and
rationales ofclub theory to be an appropriate modeling device in all coordination situations
that agricultural producers confront. But the importance of club theory as an analytical
framework for theoretical analysis of agricultural cooperatives is evident (Vitaliano 1977;
Sexton 1984, 1995a).
Olsonworked along similarlines as Buchanan to clarify how most public goods can only
be defined for specific groups ofpeople. In that context, aspecific group achieves a coopera-
tive gain from their coordinated or organized actions, with the public goods dimension
being that no member can be denied access to the services that generate the joint gains.
However, Olson's major objective in this work was to examine the problem of individual
incentives to form cooperatives or to otherwise produce local public goods, rather than to
examine the specifics ofhow public goods are locally defined and shared.
A framework ofthe cohesiveness ofa membership, that is, their willingness to agree on
procedures for burdens and benefits sharing, is fundamental to a theory of cooperation.
While club theory addresses the membership size aspect on the assumption of equal shar-
ing, there are several other dimensions to be specified in order to form a cooperative. Indi-
viduals must initially bargain over who cooperates with whom and under what terms. An-
swers to these kinds ofquestions are the basis ofcoalition analysis ingame theory Staatz and
Sexton applied this to modeling cooperatives in the 1980s (Staatz 1983, 1987b; Sexton
1986).
Playing the coalition game can be envisioned as a process of bargaining, but in eco-
nomic modeling, it is a matter of identifying conditions for stable equilibrium solutions.
Incentives to bargain for different coalitions or for revising distribution rules can arise for
different reasons. For example, there might be an optimal limit to the coalition size, or
participants may have significantly different stand-alone opportunities, or there may be
major differences in the synergistic (superadditivity) gains of different combinations or
coalition configurations.8 Journal of Cooperatives 1998
Both Staatz and Sexton look back to Phillips as a progenitor of coalition modeling for
agricultural cooperatives (Staatz 1994, Sexton 1986). The proportionality prinCiple inPhillips's
work, keeping an equal ratio of burden to benefit sharing across all members, is a stable
coalition solution. In other words, no member has an incentive to seek a change in the
distribution rules. However, Staatz and Sexton point out the operation of a unanimity rule
in coalition solutions, and Phillips's prescription for proportional voting would not be nec-
essary orjustified over a one-member, one-vote procedure in this regard.
Cooperative Purpose Dilemmas and Challenges
One ofthe vexing issues in the evolution ofcooperative thought and the review ofnew
theoretical treatmentsjust discussed concerns the existence ofmultiple purposes and objec-
tives for the cooperative business organization. Some of these are embedded in different
interpretations of the social and economic philosophies of cooperation. They derive from
various interpretations of internal (member) and external (societal) benefits of cooperative
organizationassessed from bothshort-and longer-termperspectives. Others deal with inter-
nal operations and practices and who is calling the shots, in a behavioral sense, and for
whose benefit.
Social Service versus Economic Philosophy of Cooperation
From a sociological perspective at least three purposes ofeconomic organization can be
identified: making profits, providing services, and realizing meaning. Their predominance
and mix tend to vary both across and within organizations. These differing purposes pen-
etrate the theory and practice ofcooperation producingvarious practical as well as theoreti-
cal dilemmas. These dilemmas include (1) meaning versus service, (2) efficiency versus de-
mocracy, and (3) bureaucratic logic versus cooperative logic. The intersection of purpose
and dilemma tends to fragment understandings ofcooperation, negating the economic phi-
losophies of some, while supporting those of others.
Exemplar organizations tend to range along acontinuumfrom investment oriented firms
OOFs) at the profits end, to the Kibbutz at the life meaning end as shown in figure 1.
FIGURE I. Continuum of Cooperative Purposes
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Cooperative organizations can be found at different locations onthe continuum, though
they are predominantlylocated within the service purpose, focusing on serving the greatest
numbers of people over the longest period of time (Craig 1993; Nadeau and Thompson
1996). Most farm input and service cooperatives fall into this spot on the continuum. Ag-
ricultural marketing cooperatives tend to be found between the service and profit purpose
orientation, with new generation cooperatives attempting to preserve earnings benefits for
defined membership over time. The life meaningpurpose at the otherendofthe continuum
gives much greater focus to participation and democratic process. Cooperative organiza-
tions typically contain elements ofall three ofthese tendencies.Evolution of Cooperative Thought,Theory, and Purpose 9
The reality of the marketplace tends to drive participation and service in opposite direc-
tions. Participation and democracy take time. The markets' demand for efficiency is ever
present andever felt. This tension becomes manifest inorganizational form andinorganiza-
tionallogic.
The need for efficiency, and the predominant emphasis on the bottom line, can drive
organizational form toward bureaucratic shape and logic emphasizingorganizationalhierar-
chies and a flow ofauthority and centralized decision making from the top down (Breimyer
1996). This logic is distinct from grounded, cooperative logic, or logic emphasizing local
responsiveness, decentralized decision making, andparticipation and involvement. The fun-
damental dilemma is to move with the easier, less complex, but bureaucratic approach to
organizational maintenance, or remain groundedwithinmore complex, democraticallybased
cooperatives.
There are several interrelated, polemic themes that emerge from the philosophy and
theory ofcooperation and the cooperative movement, as well as from the practice ofcoop-
eration as realized in organizations functioning to meet internal goals. Whether to organize
for service or meaning/participation is a central dilemma that is found internationally The
predominance of each tendency varies across types of cooperative organizations as well as
within organizations. NorthAmerican agricultural input cooperatives are primarily service
cooperatives, while conventional agricultural marketingcooperativeshave a service orienta-
tion, but with an increased emphasis on earnings.
Given a competitive marketplace, efficiency criteria tend to drive organizational form
toward bureaucratic models, and, paradoxically, away from cooperative logic form. When
participation declines andorganizations tend toward greatercentralization ofdecision mak-
ing (bureaucratic logic), it becomes increasinglydifficult to recognize differences incoopera-
tive behavior from investor-oriented firm behavior, and cooperative character can be lost.
However, acting without recognizing market imperatives (need for earnings) can also result
in the loss of cooperative presence.
This dilemma explains, in large measure, the root differences between the social and
economic philosophies ofcooperation. Social philosophers emphasize democratic control
inthe form ofone-person, one-vote as the cardinal principle ofcooperation (Lambert 1963).
Economic philosophers, on the other hand, emphasize the distribution of benefits in pro-
portion to use as the cardinal principle. Cooperative leaders, likeJerryVoorhis (1975), have
expressed a concern with the decline of the service and participatory end ofthe continuum
in cooperatives that strictly advocate a "bottom line" orientation.
Ifwe broaden our scope and examine agricultural cooperatives as part of a rural infra-
structure, and ifwe embrace rural development and public goods goals, other attributes of
cooperatives can be identified. The benefits ofcooperatives inrural settings are decentraliza-
tion ofdecision making and local generation and distribution ofwealth. The very nature of
the organization empowers rural people and their communities. The impact of cooperative
operations can, therefore, be viewed as a public developmental good.
Benefits for Whom?
Agency theory and the institutional discussion ofproperty rights often describe "residual
claimants" as the beneficiaries ofjoint action whether they are investor-owned firms or co-
operatives. Ifa traditional model ofa prinCipal-agent relationship is applied, then the group
that is the primaryrecipient offruits ofthe organizational effort is unambiguouslydefined-
it is composed, presumably, ofthose who provided the initiative for the organizing efforts in
the first place. Agency theory has heen developed to identify problems of establishing in-
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·organization is viewed as a nexus of contracts or collaborative efforts among participating
units oragent groups, each reaching for their rewards from the organizational endeavor. For
instance, workers look for improved wage andbenefit packages, managementseeksits "proper
remuneration," the sales force seeks incentives for its marketing performance, and user-
members ofa cooperative seek superior returns on their marketed product, commensurate
with their use and investment in jointvalue-added activity
A challenge for cooperative members is to remain the primary beneficiaries of group
action for which they originally organized. They must strive to notbecome"residual" claim-
ants in the sense that they are collecting crumbs left over after all other agent groups have
received their due. This is particularly critical in organizations lacking firm board gover-
nance control and in instances where management continues to push for sales growth in-
volving non-member-relatedbusiness activity Itbecomes even more critical when coopera-
tives develop large, unallocated reserves based on this non-member business, as noted by
Royer (1992) and Staatz (1989), that represent a form of "collective" equity Management
invariably views this equity as the product ofits, rather than members', efforts. As notedby
Staatz and Royer, there exists great potential for the character ofcooperative organizations to
change or to be compromised in such situations, particularly in larger, complex organiza-
tions.
Some of these situations have even led to conversions to investor-owned firms or to
members losing control through goal inversion inwhich maintaining the "corporate" values
becomes more important than keeping the business oriented to members as primarybenefi-
ciaries. Allocation practices, therefore, become central features ofeffective cooperation,just
as governance practices are important in organizational control. Especially noteworthy in
this respect are the efforts by AgFirst Farm Credit Bank of Columbia, South Carolina, to
emphasize patronage refunds to memberborrowersre'Yards for continuedcooperative busi-
ness with the cooperative bankingsystem (Love 1996).
Role ofCooperative Bargaining
It can be observed that strategic attempts to increase market shares in final product
markets through aggressive sales efforts is often done by underbidding competitors, using
discounts, and/or using special promotions. Thus, product prices tend to take a downward
rather than upward direction. When coupled with the incentives for other agent groups to
broaden theirshare ofthe organization's economic pie, thecombinedeffect ofthese activities
can be reduced returns to cooperative owner-users, directly conflicting with their goal of
attaining higher prices and returns from the cooperative.
To offset the consequences ofthis phenomenon, farm operators in the United States and
a number of countries have used cooperative bargaining associations as their profeSSional
associations to effectively negotiate livable farm gate prices (Bunje 1980, Iskow and Sexton
1992, Marcus and Frederick 1994). The idea is to identify a fair, base field price consistent
with supply and demand conditions for the crop or livestock involved. While this negotiat-
ingeffort primarilyinvolves non-cooperative processors, marketingcooperatives inthe same
sector often use this established price as a benchmark or transfer price in their own opera-
tions for measuring their performance.
Cooperative members have, therefore, not only some assurance that they are not whip-
lashedby"residual" returns, butalso abenchmarkbywhich to measure the true value added
to their products and investments in the marketing cooperative endeavor. In fact, grower
membership in both cooperative bargaining associations and marketing cooperatives is not
uncommon and is an appropriate means for maximizing producers' interests and represen-
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channel participants. This implies a cooperative systems approach to improving farm in-
comes thatinvolves the interaction ofseveral organizationalstructures, based on theirunique
structural and functional roles, in representing farm operators in a coordinated fashion
(Torgerson 1971).
If Helmberger (1966) and Fulton (1995) are correct in forecasting the demise of inde-
pendent farm operators as entrepreneurs in the so-called "industrialization" of American
agriculture, then the horizontal representation of contract growers in vertically integrated
systems through cooperative bargaining associations takes on a new and increasing signifi-
cance in the economics ofcollective actioninagriculture. The problemis that contractgrow-
ers typically have little voice in their relationships with corporate integrators. Integrators
continue to prefer to deal with growers on a one-on-one basis and not with their associa-
tions. However, numerous instances of discriminatory practices by corporate integrators
against their contract growers, like contract cutbacks, cutoffs, short weighing, and actual
black listing of growers who have attempted to represent their interests collectively, have
been documented and are a matter ofpublic record. This has led to passage of the Agricul-
tural Fair PracticesAct of 1967, which defined unfair trade practices butprovided little relief
to growers, due to weak enforcement provisions and to inclusion of a disclaimer clause
(Torgerson 1970).
A number of states, like California and Michigan, have enacted more advanced farm
bargainingstatutes. Federalbills like those introducedbyformer democratic SenatorMondale
and democratic Congressman Pennetta have been the focus of considerable discussion.
Renewed emphasis has been placed on these problems by the USDA Advisory Committee
on ConcentrationinAgriculture (1996) and the National CommissiononSmall Farms (1998).
Legislative efforts by cooperative bargaining associations are currently being planned to
revisit amendments to the Agricultural Fair Practices Act in the 105th session of Congress.
The development ofthis new legislative effort and the institutional relations by cooperative
bargaining associations with integrators-both IOFs and cooperatives-present a fruitful
area for further theoretical and empirical work by the profession.
Value-Added Cooperatiou Reuewal
Cooperatives represent one of the few options that farm entrepreneurs have for surviv-
ing in a more concentrated and integrated global agricultural environment. Recognition of
this fact, inspite ofHelmberger's and Fulton's research, has led to asignificant renaissance in
cooperative marketing with a focus on value-added activities. As an off-farm extension of
the farm firm, the essential function of agricultural cooperatives is to perform vertical inte-
gration. Cooperatives harmonize transactions and, in so doing, lower transaction costs re-
ducing the margin between the farm and retail prices. This joint action is necessary for
farmers to accomplish vertical integrationbecause ofdisparities between the minimum effi-
cient scale of operation in farming in relation to the upstream and downstream industries
(Sexton 1995b). Farm operators are able to provide themselves direct economic benefits
and to better deal with market power of processors by using vertical integration through
cooperatives. The cooperative then canbe seen as anintegral part ofthe economic organiza-
tion ofagriculture that enables farm operators to enhance their status as entrepreneursthrough
vertical collective action.
Cooperatives, from a public policy perspective, are seen as pro-competitive market
instruments. Producer members respond to improved prices by producing more, since
members individually determine their production decisions. Empirical evidence suggests
that profit margins are generally lower in markets with a substantial cooperative presence
(Rogers and Petraglia 1994, Haller 1993). Cotterill (1997) has also found that expanding12 Journal of Cooperatives 1998
agricultural cooperative marketing theory to the differentiated product markets provides
theoretical support for this result. Even in a differentiated market, a cooperative will tend to
provide an efficient amount of product variety and price differentials because each product
will be priced at cost, whereas an IOF, facing a downward sloping demand curve for each
product, will price where it equalizes marginal revenue and marginal cost. Thus, for con-
sumers too, cooperatives can perform as competitive yardsticks in oligopolistic food indus-
tries.
A continuing cooperative challenge is found with free riders that want to benefit from
cooperative action by staying outside the organization and not sharing any ofthe organiza-
tional costs. To overcome this challenge, and to make members the primarybeneficiaries, a
number ofnew generation cooperatives have organized by limiting members and requiring
asubstantial equitycommitment from themthrough the purchase ofdelivery rights. Invest-
ment is, therefore, more closely tied to patronage. The fact that delivery rights are tradable
is seen as overcoming the opportunistic behavior problems by some members; for example,
the free riderandhorizon problems are attenuatedby this structure andorganizational prac-
tice (Harris, Stefanson, and Fulton 1996).
New generation cooperatives may solve some of these long-standing problems of con-
ventional cooperatives. However, they create potential for anew problem in that the limited
membership may indeed curtail any or all of the pro-competitive effects of conventional
open membership cooperatives. From a consumer welfare point of view, this limited mem-
bership may lead, as some postulate, to performance worse than that of IOFs. Empirical
evidence on this issue is lacking. Moreover, there are reasons to suggest that pro-competitive
effects may still be maintained for several reasons:
1. the cooperative provides anopportunity for dispersed ownership and atomistic farm
firm survival;
2. it tailors benefits for those who are owner users;
3. productiondecisions continue to rest withindividual producers respondingto mar-
ket price signals, although they may not be able to deliver all they produce to the
value-added cooperative, depending onthe numberand size oftheir delivery rights
relative to production;
4. enhanced efficiency can be achieved through this value-added strategy; as found by
Koenig (1995) who investigated a Red River sugar beet cooperative and found sig-
nificant increases in the quality of beets produced, thereby lowering internal trans-
action costs; and
5. Cotterill (1995) has found cooperatives force competitors in concentrated markets
to provide comparable services and prices.
Each ofthese pro-competitive effects appears to continue with the new generation coopera-
tives using tradable delivery rights.
Along with advantages, there also appear to be limitations worth noting. One limitation
is the tendency for manynew generation cooperatives to be organized inlocal communities
on a fairly small scale. While certainly advantageous from a community development per-
spective, as advocated by Egerstrom (1994), this also leads to a large numberoffragmented
sellers in intermediate and final product markets. This fragmentation can lead to buyers
pitting one cooperative against another in the exact way that farm operators were affected
before organizing their cooperatives. Similarly, small size suggests that the level and quality
ofmanagement the cooperative can afford, in often highly technical businesses, may not be
the same as with larger firms. Forinstance, it has been pointed out that small ethanol plants
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An even greaterlimitation, still to be documented, involves potential compromisesinthe
user-owner nature of cooperatively owned businesses. Some new generation businesses
appear to have adopted more of an "investor" than "user" culture and have included some
investor "members" who are not engaged in production for supplying the plants in territo-
ries where new plants have been constructed. Similarly, a few new generation cooperatives
have recently learned expensive lessons by paying market prices to members on delivery to
the pool, only to find that they could not afford to pay those prices based on income re-
ceived from final product sales. Such lessons, learned once but not to be repeated, have
beenvery costly and have challenged their long-term economic viability. Finally, by defini-
tion, limited membership cooperatives exclude some would-be members, and entry levels
to these organizations may come at higher prices due to appreciated value ofdelivery rights.
On balance, however, a strong rationale exists for farmers to vertically integrate down-
stream because profit levels are higher at more advanced levels of processing and distribu-
tion (Egerstrom, Bos, andVan Dijk 1996). Using these cooperatives as instruments for more
carefully tailoring supplies to meet effective product demand improves coordination and
efficiency ofthe marketing system. Further, capturingpart ofthe increased marketing mar-
gins is a means for farm operators to successfully preserve their entrepreneurialstatus and to
compete with industrial firms attempting to dominate marketing channels. This strategy
becomes more important as a component of the economic organization of agriculture as
federal government disengages from price and income support programs.
Coordination Imperatives
Organizing marketing efforts of atomistic production units over a geographical territory
as expansive as the United States, let alone NorthAmerica, remains one ofthe greatest chal-
lenges facing the cooperative movement. It is a daunting task, but one that is attainable as
farm numbers continue to dwindle and incentives based on continued market concentra-
tion increase. The opportunity exists for developing more effective forms of coordination
that actually improve performance of the marketing system as authorized by the Capper-
Volstead Act. System rewards from improved coordination have been most visible through
efforts of farm input cooperatives at the regional and interregional levels in the plant food,
crop protectant, petroleum, farm credit, and energy sectors.
There are several levels orstages ofcoordination, as pointed outbySchaefer (1987). The
most fundamental is the formation of a cooperative by agricultural producers. Organiza-
tional federations are another stage. Intense competition among marketingcooperatives has
made gains from their improved coordination more illusive. However, a number have over-
come rivalries and have used marketing agencies in common. Many of the new generation
cooperatives that have established value-added business operations will increasingly dis-
cover the importance of coordination with other cooperatives that operate in their indus-
tries.
The alternative of a marketing agency in common allows members to retain ownership
of their individual assets while the common agency provides various services and product
selling coordination (Reynolds 1994). Liebrand and Spatz (1994) show how this concept
can be applied in the dairy industry for export marketing for both bulk and differentiated
products. Successful applications in over-order pricing of fluid milk; international market-
ing ofcotton; marketing ofrefined sugar and sugar by-products, cottonseed oil, dried fruits
and nuts; and coordinating co-packing arrangements for fruit juice cooperatives have all
demonstrated the strength of this approach. More studies are needed to identify potential
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Evaluating the innerworkings ofmarketing federations canalso determine practices and
structures that lead to effectively representing membersinthe marketplace. In anexhaustive
industry organization study, Mueller and colleagues (987) analyzed the relationships of
local member cooperative packing and agency packing houses to the marketing efforts of
Sunkist Growers for evidence of monopolistic behavior. They observed that the Federal
Trade Commission's challenge to Sunkist failed to incorporate the unique organizational
features of a marketing cooperative. While Sunkist did achieve a sizable market share, the
analysis concluded that Sunkist did not behave as a monopolistic barometric price leader
and did not engage in price discrimination. It also found its price premium was modest
compared to others in the trade, and that the unique characteristics ofa federated coopera-
tive structure did not foreclose access of others to the market (Mueller, HeImberger, and
Paterson 1987).
Joint ventures offer another alternative structure for coordination among cooperatives.
Based on some case studies from the dairy industry, Frederick (987) identified guidelines
for structuring and operating joint ventures. Fulton (996) has found that joint ventures
and strategic alliances among local cooperatives lead to advantages ofsize economies and, in
some cases, risk diversification and supply assurance. If, as Mueller (990) suggests, joint
ventures tend to be highlyunstable and relatively shortlived, then their role as a transitional
stage to outright merger or consolidation requires further research.
Public Goods and Internalized Benefits
The reduction in federal government support for agricultural producers suggests a re-
newed and larger role for cooperatives as aself-help form ofgroup action. To manycoopera-
tive economists, however, there is concern about the sustainability of traditional forms of
organization and approaches (Cook 1992, 1995, and Fulton 1995). They view larger forces
of change at work in the economy, society, and in industry organization, that seem to be
gathering a momentum that will sweep aside the old ways andjustifications for agricultural
cooperatives. These developments, as well as recent changes made bysome cooperatives to
emphasize an investor orientation bymembers, raise a couple ofdilemmas in the basic pur-
poses or rationales for agricultural cooperatives. One of these dilemmas is in potentially
diminishing apublic interest role for cooperatives while endeavoring to re-design more sus-
tainable organizations. Another dilemma, related to making cooperatives more sustainable,
is whether or not fundamental principleswill become altered to an extent that participation
in such organizations would not really involve a process of cooperation-that is, member
consensus, control, and focus on serving the businesses of the membership.
Agricultural cooperatives provide many services that the market either does not provide,
or does so only in limited quantity or quality The reason a cooperative provides otherwise
unmet services is because its purpose is to serve the interests ofmembers in terms ofenhanc-
ing the profitability of their individual enterprises. Emelianoff and many others articulate
this point. The benefits unique to a cooperative, in most cases, strictly accrue to the mem-
bership or are internalized by them. However, the notion of cooperatives having a public
interest role has often been argued on the basis ofexternal economies or benefits that they
generate. Many of the early cooperatives that handled specialty products, especially fruits
and nuts, undertook costly market development and product promotion programs that
often benefited all producers in an industry, whether members or not. Although there is a
trend toward more closed, defined membership cooperatives, the expansion of non-tradi-
tional crops and livestock is creating a demand for traditional-type cooperative market de-
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kets where cooperative involvement has ensured the prevalence of a competitive price, as
mentioned earlier in connection with Nourse's ideas.
In terms of traditional public goods theory, some economists might view the external
economies from cooperatives as a market failure. In an earlier decade, they might have rec-
ommended some type of government program to eliminate the externality In the present
decade, however, the approachwould be to internalize suchbenefitsbyestablishingamecha-
nism for property rights. Recent developments in cooperative practice to internalize or
otherwise limit such external benefits have used closed memberships, product differentia-
tion, and more substitution ofbranded for generic advertising (Reynolds 1997).
The practice orstrategy oforganizing a more exclusive approach to cooperation accords
with local or group public goods theory, as discussed earlier. The "public" aspect of such
goods or services derives from two basic conditions: I) users regard the supply of those
services byinvestor-controlled firms to be inadequate in quantityorqualityand 2) members
are informed about and consent to the terms by which all other individuals have access to
the services. Suchservices are local public goods even though the benefits are privatized and
internalized to the group. Such a group accomplishes coordination and democratic gover-
nance.
Furthermore, there are manysituationswhere suchlocal publicgoods, particularlyamong
agricultural producers, have a larger public interest benefit. Economic efficiency improve-
ments andgreater and more widely distributed income gains often result from acooperative,
formed and operated as an exclusive or local public good. The new generation or defined
membership cooperatives exemplify this type ofpublic good.
Another potential dilemma is that interest among producers to form cooperatives or to
maintain their memberships may gradually abate if organizational changes are not carried
out that have broader appeal to what Murray Fulton views as a trend toward individualism
(Fulton 1995). A dilemma arises if organizations follow an approach of substituting an
investor for a patronage oruser orientationby members, onthe rationale thatsuch abroader
business orientation would increase member support.
The long-termpotentialis uncertain for creatingorganizations thatare notdifferent from
investor partnerships and are cooperatives in name only. In Buchanan's conception of a
continuum between a pure public good and a private good, the investor orientation would
appear to eliminate the middle ground, moving any non-government organization com-
pletely into the realm ofa private good.
Property rights theory has been used by many critics ofgovernment programs to design
non-governmental solutions to externality problems. Those believing that cooperatives can
become more sustainable through improved assignment of property rights follow an analo-
gous line of reasoning. However, property rights have to be understood as general mecha-
nisms for providing individuals with control over the use of defined attributes of assets,
whether they be physical, financial, or intellectual property (Barzel 1997, Fulton 1995).
A1chian (977) makes the interesting observation that, in various cultural and historical
contexts, local customs and social norms are mechanisms for defining and enforcing prop-
erty rights without formal contracts and government enforcement.
Throughout the history ofagricultural cooperatives, various kinds of social norms have
functioned to protect and enforce certain attributes or qualities ofservices that cooperatives
have provided as benefits to individual members. Perhaps in today's economy and society;
such implicit property rights may need to be more explicitly assigned and defined for each
individual. But these developments need to be accomplished in ways that do notundermine
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suchexplicit definingofpropertyrights incooperatives should be to establish programs and
rules that protect individual interests and keep anyone member from benefiting at the ex-
pense of other members.
AssimilatingThought,Theory, and Purpose
The challenges and dilemmas described above identify some directions for future re-
search. The range of these issues and the complexity of many of the dilemmas require a
multi-disciplinaryapproach, whethercarriedoutthroughcollaboration ofprofessionals from
different disciplines workingtogetherorbysynthesis ofindividual contributions from mem-
bers of several different disciplines. Cooperative economists have made excellent use of
ideas from economic theory that generallyassume a framework ofindividual utilitymaximi-
zation. Continuedintellectual diligence is required to apply these insights to the cooperative's
institutional settingwith democraticallygenerated rules for group coordination. This will be
necessary to adapt and work through many of the different implications of new develop-
ments in economic theory for cooperatives.
The need for an improved "language of cooperation," pointed out by Fulton (J995), is
one aspect ofthe future research agenda for assimilating evolvingcooperative thought, theory,
and purpose. In considering his point in a historical context, it is possible that, in the past,
many producers were naturally drawn to cooperation and may have had more aptitude for
working out cooperative solutions with similar producers in their communities. Perhaps
these individuals, when given the basics ofcooperative principles, depended less on a more
comprehensive and sophisticated language of cooperation than today's producers. An im-
proved "language ofcooperation" is needed if, indeed, cooperatives are going to continue to
be formed and to be effective in the future. Communication problems are evident in situa-
tions where cooperation has economic advantages but fails to be attractive to producers.
The cooperative method ofbusiness will prosper if cooperatives adhere to their demo-
cratic principles. Those who believe cooperatives should assign property rights to members
that are unrelated to member patronage and use are slighting the traditional methods of
propertyrights assignment, suchas timely redemption ofmember equity Ifthe language of
individualism does not give much support to cooperative principles, then these principles
or rules may need to be re-expressed in a strategic framework that builds trust. Most indi-
viduals value trust in their dealings with others. Establishing trust can be a strategic advan-
tage for cooperatives when the basic principles of democratic governance and cooperation
are followed.
Many practitioners, cooperative managers, and developmentspeCialists possess their own
languages ofcooperation. However, to develop awidelyshared, robust language ofcoopera-
tion for diverse situations, a more holistic, multidisciplinary approach to theory research,
and the deSign ofcooperative education materials will be needed.
Along similar lines ofreasoning, Thomas Schelling has endeavored, since the I950s, to
create astrongerlinkbetween theoryandanalysis for practical decisions. In the reprinting of
his classic work, The Strategy ofConflict (1960, 1980), that could have easily been titled The
Strategy ofCooperation, he reflected back on original hopes for this project:
...I hoped to help establish an interdisciplinary field that had been variously de-
scribedas "theory ofbargaining," "theoryofconflict," or"theoryofstrategy" Iwanted
to show thatsome elementarytheory, cuttingacross economics, sociology, andpoliti-
cal science, even law and philosophy and perhaps anthropology, could be useful not
only to formal theorists but also to people concerned with practical problems...The
field that I hoped would become established has continued to develop, but not ex-
plosively, and without acquiring a name ofits own.Evolution of CooperativeThought,Theory, and Purpose 17
Schelling's concern with coordination failures and strategy in terms of a society or of
groups avoiding movement into sub-optimal equilibrium traps is relevant and similar in
approach to the previouslymentioned macro coordination issues identifiedby Shaffer. Fur-
thermore, it provides a framework for a retrospective, more strategic look at the problems of
achieving coordination, as confronted by Sapiro and Nourse, and for helping cooperatives
work in the future. Sapiro was the architect of commodity-wide coordination plans, with
long-termmembercontracts andthe required "minimum-market-share-or-nothing" approach
to organizing cooperatives. Forhis part, Nourse understoodthatcoordinationandcommit-
ment canbe built on effective economic performance at the local membership level ofmar-
kets and can be strengthened by nurturing localized identification and control. Future ef-
forts canbenefit by taking arenewed look at the ideas and lessons ofthe past, particularly if
they draw on interdisciplinary methods of research and analysis.
The removal of price support programs is ushering in a period of adjustment, where
cooperatives can playa larger role in generating information and in coordinating decisions.
The institutional and market changes being brought about by a reduced role of the federal
government involve awide range ofuncertain outcomes for agricultural producers, ranging
from potential for higher returns to lost opportunities.
Higher returns are likely to prevail in the long run if cooperatives expand their role in
helping producers add more value to their products. But, situations of lost opportunities
may arise from a combination of failure to coordinate for largerjoint gains and limited pro-
ducer control of a vertically integrated food system. If this latter scenario prevails, the re-
search agenda will need to be oriented toward developing new institutional arrangements
that canlead to Pareto improvements. Research will have animpactbyfocusing ondevelop-
ing marketingand organizationalinnovations andby promotingmore integrative bargaining
solutions to the conflictinginterests thatarise intoday's and the future's agricultural economy
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